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what is said literally. "We understand the person who offers the excuse 
to mean that he did what he did only because he was unable to do other­
wise, or only because he had to do it. And we understand him to mean . . . 
that when he did what he did it was not because that was what he really 
wanted to do."4 Frankfurt's attempt to explain away what is literally said 
is suspect for at least two reasons. First, a person who tells us he did what 
he did because he was unable to do otherwise or because he had to do it 
might very well have wanted to do what he did, believed that he ought 
not do what he wanted to do, and not have done what he did except for 
the fact that he was unable not to do it because he was determined to do it. 
Second, a person might very well utter these words in a context where his 
wanting to do something that is good deterministically led to his doing it. 
Because he knows this was the case, he is insisting that he does not deserve 
any praise or reward for doing what he did.
As I stated in FSCBQ, I do not know how to resolve the question about 
the identity of D and ~AP in any non-question-begging way. But I also 
do not think that there is a non-question-begging argument against a 
compatibilist view of determinism, alternative possibilities, and moral 
responsibility and in support of a libertarian view of these matters. Bor­
rowing some terminology from Fischer, I believe that when we come to 
the issues of freedom, moral responsibility, determinism, and alternative 
possibilities we ultimately reach a "dialectical stalemate" (pp. 166-67). But 
even though Fischer's way with regard to these issues is not my way, I am 
happy to say that My Way is a wonderful collection of essays by a superb 
philosopher. It is a book well worth reading.
NOTES
1. Stewart Goetz, "Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and Begging the 
Question," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. XXIX, ed. Peter A. French, 
Howard Wettstein and John Martin Fischer (Oxford: Blackwell), 2005, pp. 83­
105.
2. Peter van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1983), p. 3. Richard Taylor (Metaphysics, 3rd ed. [Englewood Cliffs: Prentice 
Hall, 1983], p. 34) defines 'determinism' as the principle that "there are ante­
cedent conditions . . . given which [something] could not be other than it is."
3. Harry Frankfurt, "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility," 
Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969): p. 838.
4. Ibid.2
Personal Identity in Theological Perspective, ed. Richard Lints, Michael S. 
Horton and Mark R. Talbot. Grand Rapids, Mich: Eerdmans, 2006. vi + 226 
pages. $20 (paper).
FRANK B. DILLEY, University of Delaware (Emeritus)
The title of this volume misled this reviewer who was expecting a collec­
tion of papers on "Personal Identity in Theological Perspective" to have 
at its theme "personal identity" issues—bodily continuity, continuity of
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character, continuity of the soul and the like. Only one paper in this col­
lection, contributed by Nancey Murphey, explores such issues. Instead 
the theme of this volume is suggested by the subtitle of Richard Lints' 
introductory chapter, "Theological Anthropology in Context." The theme 
is human nature, not personal identity, and the "theological perspective" 
is evangelical and confessionalist. The papers would fit a title such as 
"Human Nature in Evangelical and Confessionalist Christian Perspec­
tive" but the reviewer can understand why the editors chose the perkier 
title, "Personal Identity in Theological Perspective."
These papers were originally presented at a colloquium in Colorado 
Springs in 2002, were discussed at length, and the authors were given the 
opportunity to revise the original papers. One additional paper, by Stanley 
Grenz, was added after the discussions. The theme of the collection is what 
it means to be human and all of the papers were written by evangelical or 
confessionally oriented Christian thinkers. Differences in orientation can 
be found in the papers themselves and were pointed out by Lints in his 
introduction, but the papers themselves did not dwell on differences. As 
Lints suggests, they were looking for common ground. Also the editors 
chose not to present any of the discussions of the papers at the confer­
ence because the attempt to capture such discussions "normally makes for 
lousy reading." This reader thinks that the discussion might have made 
a more exciting volume, and wished that the finished papers had made 
more reference to each other.
The opening chapter, "Theological Anthropology in Context" (Richard 
Lints), provides an introduction to the various papers and their themes 
and is followed by the papers grouped under three categories. "Setting 
the Context" includes "Biblical Humanism: the Patristic Convictions" 
(Robert Louis Wilken), "Homo theologicus: Aspects of a Lutheran Doctrine 
of Man" (William C. Weinrich), "Post-Reformation Reformed Anthropol­
ogy" (Michael S. Horton) and "The Social God and the Relational Self: 
Toward a Theology of the Imago Dei in the Postmodern Context" (Stanley 
J. Grenz). "Significant Challenges" deal with "Nonreductive Physicalism: 
Philosophical Challenges" (Nancey Murphy) and "Anthropology, Sexual­
ity and Sexual Ethics: The Challenge of Psychology" (Stanton L. Jones and 
Mark A. Yarhouse). "Suggestive Proposals" contains "Personal Bodies: 
A Theological Anthropological Proposal" (David H. Kelsey), "Learning 
from the Ruined Image: Moral Anthropology after the Fall" (Mark R. Tal­
bot), "Image and Office: Human Personality and the Covenant" (Michael
S. Horton) and "Imaging and Idolatry: The Sociality of Personhood in the 
Canon" (Richard Lints). The subtitles are illuminating and illustrate the 
variety of perspectives from which they were written and so I have pro­
vided them. Except for the Grenz piece and the two Horton chapters, the 
papers seem to have been written specifically for this conference and are 
not available elsewhere.
Because some selection has to be made, I have chosen to comment on 
the contributions by psychologists and philosophers rather than on the 
chapters written by theologians and historians.
Philosopher Nancey Murphy develops her "evangelical physicalism" 
in response to three centuries of evangelical endorsement of mind-brain 
dualism. She apologizes that she has not yet "been able to provide well-
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considered solutions to all of the problems I have raised" (p. 117). She 
claims that her nonreductive physicalism fits well with almost all scien­
tists (except for Sir John Eccles) and with almost all secular philosophers 
(she says she knows of only one exception), but that Christian philos­
ophers are divided between physicalism and dualism (p. 96). Her reli­
gious-philosophical project has been to argue for Christian nonreductive 
physicalism. Problems she chooses not to address here are Biblical texts 
which seem to imply dualism and the issue of "intermediate states," 
and she does note in passing that Christian dualism has had undesirable 
consequences in that "it has given Christians something to be concerned 
about—the soul and its final destiny—in place of Jesus' concern with the 
kingdom of God" (p. 97).
She addresses five problems. The evidential base for physicalism is the 
success of science, but science has had trouble explaining the distinctive­
ness of human persons. She looks to our neurological complexity and cul­
tural development which "together resulted in the capacity for genuine 
moral reasoning, including the ability to recognize an objective obligation 
to obey the voice of the Creator" (pp. 102-03). Another issue is that of per­
sonal identity which is complicated by the problem of having a new and 
radically different resurrection body. She favors "character identity" as the 
criterion for personal identity rather than material continuity (p. 107). With 
respect to free will and mental causation, she proposes that the physical 
body has modified itself to provide for both since free will and mental 
causation are obviously capacities which we have. She has made the case 
here and elsewhere for "evangelical physicalism" and her arguments are 
well worth reading.
The other philosopher presented in this collection is Mark Talbot, who 
wrote the original paper for this colloquium. Talbot examines common 
platitudes about child raising, about wanting to take "the wantonness out 
of little human beings" (p. 166), and our expectation that parents assist the 
development of self-regulating persons. Our capacity to realize why wan­
tonness is unnatural, the use of language, and the development of social 
referencing provide natural prolegomena to Christian anthropology. We 
are more than our physiologies; we seem to require spirituality as human 
beings (p. 172). Our child-raising practices recognize what we naturally 
want to become, but also show that our capacity to do so has been ru­
ined. As an evangelical, he points out that this natural knowledge does 
not substitute for revelation, but is illuminated by it. Redeemed natural 
theology, "by starting from Scripture, can identify what is true in unre­
generate thinking as well as what even the unregenerated should know 
. . . and then deploy those truths in articulating and defending Christian 
belief" (p. 174).
In discussing sexual ethics, the psychologists Jones and Yarhouse la­
ment evangelical neglect of many social issues other than sexual, as well 
as high divorce rates among evangelicals. Not unsurprisingly, they defend 
traditional sexuality, endorsing claims that the practice of people who pray 
together is highly correlated with sexual satisfaction and have a lower rate 
of divorce, and that cohabitation before marriage leads to high divorce 
rates, extramarital affairs and less sexual satisfaction in marriage. They 
claim that "an immense literature attests to the quality-of-life benefits of
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traditional marriage and of two-parent family arrangements" (p. 130), re­
ferring to a recent review of the research by Linda J. Waite and Maggie 
Gallagher, The Case for Marriage (New York: Broadway, 2000). If there are 
contrary estimates of the value of traditional sexuality in the review of the 
literature they cite, the authors do not choose to bring them up. Their dis­
cussion of homosexuality is based mainly on Robert A. J. Gagnon, The Bible 
and Homosexual Practice (Nashville: Abingdon, 2001). This reviewer was a 
bit surprised that they judge that tolerance of homosexuality as valid is "as 
grave in some ways as the behavioral choices of the homosexual person" 
(pp. 133, 135). It was not clear whether their objection was to tolerance 
in the church or also to tolerance by society, but I presume their remarks 
were directed at the church.
The papers deal with many dimensions of theological anthropology 
from confessionalist and evangelical Christian perspectives, and some 
readers may be disappointed, as I was, that if there were differences that 
might have surfaced in the discussions among conferees. The editors chose 
not to print them, nor did the conferees refer to them in the final versions 
of their papers. The papers have variety, are largely expository and, I pre­
sume, because they were written for this colloquium, the writers did not 
feel a need to engage in issues of justifying their perspectives nor a need to 
debate each other in their papers but were engaged in exploring common 
ground. Also, the authors made repeated references to the Bible, but did 
not explore any differences they might have had in interpreting the Bible.
The book has no index or comprehensive bibliography, but the indi­
vidual chapters have extensive footnotes in most cases. The volume con­
tains well-written papers, written by the convinced, discussed with others 
equally convinced, and now offered by publication to a wider readership. 
The book is well produced and inexpensive, and people who want to read 
the papers can well afford to purchase it for their personal libraries, but 
they should be warned that the theme of the papers is not theological per­
spectives on criteria for personal identity over time.
Reason and the Reasons of Faith, ed. Paul J. Griffiths and Reinhard Hutter. 
New York: T&T Clark, 2005. Pp. ix + 373. $60.00 (Cloth).
PAUL MACDONALD, Bucknell University
The essays that make up this book are the product of a series of discussions 
held by leading systematic theologians between December 2000 and May 
2003 at the Center of Theological Inquiry in Princeton, New Jersey. The 
goal of these discussions was to address what the editors call the "double 
crisis" of faith and reason in late modernity. Faith (which is based on the 
authoritative testimony of Christian Scripture and tradition) is in crisis, 
they say, because it has been severed from the guiding light of reason, so 
construed as a capacity for judgment, argument, and ascertaining truth. 
Reason is in crisis because it has lost sight of its most noble task of ascer­
taining truth: it has been weighed down (or misguided) by the reigning
